THE ROADMAP: MANY PITFALLS AHEAD
Jamil Hilal *  

What has come to be referred to as 'the roadmap' was drawn by the USA in consultation with UE, Russia, and United Nation (what is referred to as the international Quartet) partly to placate the anger felt by people in the Middle East and elsewhere at the double standards dominating the policies of the USA towards the Middle East in general and the Palestinian–Israeli conflict in particular. The war against Iraq and its occupation by America-British forces made the need for a document purporting to solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict seems necessary. While the possession of Iraq of weapons of mass destruction is still hotly disputed no one doubts the possession of such weapons (including a large number of nuclear bombs) by Israel. Yet no call, by the UN, EU, Russia, or the USA has been made to send inspectors to that country. Israel has violated more United Nations resolutions than any other country in the world, yet no serious move has been made to implement sanctions against it. It continues to occupy Palestinian land by force, has built and continues to expand illegal settlements, deprive a people of their right to self-determination, and practice Apartheid and collective punishments, and resorts frequently to imprisonment without trial, political assassinations, and home demolition with complete immunity. It is against this backdrop that one needs to evaluate the roadmap.

Punishing the Victim
During the last 32 months, that is since the intifada against the Israeli occupation started, the Palestinian economy has been systematically destroyed resulting in more than 60 percent of Palestinians under poverty line (according to World Bank figures), with half the labour force unemployed, with severe restrictions (with curfews and army check points) of movement of people and goods between Palestinian areas, as well as between these and the outside world, as Israel controls all entry and exits points of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBG). A separation fence is being built round the West Bank (the Gaza Strip already is fenced up) eating up in the process more land and adding more colonies (all illegal by international law). These colonies (usually referred to as settlements) number now more than 170 in WBG with a population of Jewish settlers exceeding 400 thousand. These colonies are different from what is referred to as out-posts, which consist of few caravans put on hill tops by Jewish extremists. It is to these out-posts that Sharon referred in his statement at the Aqaba summit (on the 4th of June) as 'un-authorized outpost' to be dismantled, and not to the 170 colonies that were built in the WBG over the years, all of which are, in international law, illegal. It necessary to mention such facts to disentangle the 'double talk' and the lopsided premises on which the roadmap is based, and to realize how the Government of Sharon is likely to behave in order to pre-empty the roadmap of the little content it has for the Palestinians.

Some 2275 Palestinians have been killed between September 2000 and the end of May 2003, and several thousand Palestinians are held in Israeli prisons (for 'security' reasons), of whom many are held in detention camps without trial. Israeli action and policies have left Palestinians with a besieged and emasculated the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). In comparison, some 762 Israelis have been killed during the same period (that is a third of the number of Palestinians), and Israel has been affected in that unemployment has increased, and confidence of foreign investors has waned and tourism has been hit hardly. But when the roadmap mentions violence and terrorism it is the Palestinians that are implicated not the Israeli army and government. It is the Palestinian political organizations that must be disarmed immediately (and before Palestinian have their sovereign and independent state) even if it leads to Palestinian civil war, but no mention is made of the armed settlers or the 'targeted killings' (to use Israeli terminology). Terms such as 'terrorist' and 'extremist' are used, particularly after the 11th of September 2001, to label Palestinian groups that reject and fight against Israeli claims to Palestine and to the right it gave itself to colonize, dispossess and subjugate Palestinians. Such labels are absent from the discourse, used in the roadmap and by USA and European officials, when referring to Israeli government policies and actions, even when it is dominated by the extreme right-wing (both secular and religious), as the present Sharon government. Very few political analysts, in United States and Europe, give due significance to the strong alliance existing between the Israeli right-wing hard liners (in the Likud party) and the neo-conservatives operating in the American Republican party who exercise great influence on American foreign policy. It is difficult for Palestinians, in government and outside it, to ignore the significance of links between Sharon’s government and the Bush Administration when viewing the implications of the roadmap.

The 'double tongue' is also apparent in the demands laid in the roadmap for reform of Palestinian institutions. More demands for reform have been voiced by Palestinian political and civil society when the USA and EU were showing no interest in such reforms and were in fact giving aid to the Palestinian Authority for no reason other than to keep the Oslo process alive- when all indications showed that it has reached a dead end. Thus the autocracy that characterized the style of Arafat rule, who was elected democratically as leader of the PNA, became noticeable only when he refused to accept the dictates of Israel and the United States during the final status negotiations in July 2000. Israeli wanted to impose a settlement which allows it to have control over East Jerusalem, to keep all major colonies in WBG, and to ignore the injustice that it inflicted on Palestinians in 1948, and in 1967, and their right of return to their homeland. It soon became clear that the 'reform' Israel and USA wanted, and the siege and political isolation imposed on Arafat in his headquarters in Ramallah, amounts to no more than a demand of a change in policy and strategy on the part of the Palestinian leadership that is in line with the dictates of Israel and USA. This is what both Sharon and Bush expect from the new Palestinian Prime Minister (Mahmud Abbas, known also as Abu Mazen). The post of Prime Minister is specifically mentioned in the roadmap as one of the measures of 'reform' that Palestinians have to implement, and it is clear that its aim is to weaken and sideline Arafat. But, such a demand ignores that the legitimacy of the new Prime Minister (Abu Mazen) is based on the authority which Arafat bestows on him. As such Abu Mazen cannot go against the directives of Arafat who still enjoys a wide constituency among Fatah organization (the largest political group) and nationally, as a historic leader of the Palestinian national liberation movement (PLO).

The Precariousness of Abu Mazen's Government
The survival of the Abu Mazen's government depends, to a very large extent, on is ability to deliver, politically (withdrawal of Israeli army, lifting of sieges, and checkpoints, freedom of movement, dismantling or evacuation of settlements, practical and tangible steps towards independence, etc), and economically (rebuilding the economy, cutting down unemployment and poverty rates, attracting aid and investment, improving education and health services, etc). If things do not begin to improve soon at both levels, then the new Palestinian government - regardless of the amount of support it receives from USA, EU, and the number of meetings between Abbas and Sharon - will lose its credibility and sustainability. Opposition to the government will grow inside Fatah, it is already present. Hamas (the second largest political group after Fatah), Islamic Jihad, and other groups will gain popular support for continuing armed resistance before Israel begins to withdraw, and before it stops expanding settlements and its daily repression. Arafat will emerge stronger. Armed operations against Israeli military targets will continue particularly is Israel continues to target militants, does not release political prisoners and its policies of closure and siege. Arafat has expressed dissatisfaction with what Sharon offered at the Aqaba summit, and this is not a good omen for the survival of Abu Mazen 's government.

The long drawn confrontation that followed the collapse of negotiations on the final status at Camp David in July 2000, did bring a realization among an increasing number of Palestinians that some of the methods used in the intifada, particularly the suicide bombings against civilian targets inside Israel, have been used by the Israeli right wing to mobilize Israeli society against Palestinian rights. This has been demonstrated by the swing to the right in Israel and by the sweeping victory that Sharon got in the recent Israeli Parliamentary elections. Suicide bombings have been used to justify inflicting high cost on Palestinian society, polity and economy. Nevertheless awareness in Israel has grown among growing sectors of political society that resistance to Israeli occupation cannot be subdued by military force regardless of the immense gap in the balance of forces to Israel's advantage.

A recent Palestinian public opinion poll (conducted by Beirzeit University in May of this year) showed that a majority supported a cessation of suicide bombing against civilian targets in Israel, if Israel stops assassinations, house demolitions, imprisonment of Palestinians and besieging Palestinian areas. About two-thirds supported a return to negotiations with Israel. Yet more than 70% of Palestinians doubted whether Israeli would implement the roadmap, and some 57% believed that the USA is not serious in the implementation of all the steps mentioned in the document endorsed by the Quartet (USA, the EU, the UN, & Russia).
In the same time, a recent Israeli public opinion poll (commissioned by the Israeli daily Ma'ariv) showed a majority of Israelis backing the roadmap, and only a third opposing it. Yet most Israelis, according to the same poll, think that Sharon’s qualified acceptance (with 14 reservations) of the roadmap, following its unqualified acceptance by the Palestinian leadership, is aimed at mollifying President Bush and is not an expression of a commitment on the part of Sharon to end the occupation. Only 22% of the Israelis said they trusted Abu Mazen to keep his commitments. But this percentage will be even smaller among Palestinians, if Abu Mazen does not deliver soon.
Already Hamas has said it will stop its dialogue with Abu Mazin accusing him of promising to give up too much in return for nothing at Sharm al-Sheikh and Aqaba summits. Demonstrations in the Streets of Gaza in support of Hamas's position have already started, and other demonstrations have demanded the lifting of siege on Arafat, the release of political prisoners, and a complete halt on assassination of Palestinian militants as a condition for a cease fire. The assassination by the Israeli army of two Hamas cadres, two days after the Aqaba summit (to provoke Hams leadership as it did) is a forewarning of thorny times ahead.

The Many Pitfalls Awaiting the Roadmap
The roadmap calls for the establishment of a Palestinian State, side by side Israel, by the year 2005. In this, the roadmap goes further than the Oslo accords and, as such, reflects an international consensus on the need to establish an independent Palestinian state. But, the roadmap does not put ending the Israeli occupation of the WBG (including East Jerusalem) as a precondition for a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The roadmap does not have an international legal framework to what it purports to do, not even the framework of the Oslo which mentioned United Nations resolutions 242 and 338. But more seriously it leaves the questions of Jerusalem, the Israeli colonial settlements, the issue of Palestinian refugees, control over resources, and borders of Palestinian State, for later negotiations. And, since Palestinians have been told repeatedly that dates are not sacred, the process of negotiations could drag on for years.

Israel has always followed a policy of creating facts on the ground. Most Palestinians have little confidence that it will change this practice, and are sure that it will do its at most to sabotage the creation of a sovereign and viable Palestinian State, and will continue to reject acknowledging the historic injustice it inflicted to Palestinians. The present Israeli government of Ariel Sharon envisages a Palestinian state on 40% to 50% of the WBG that forms about 10% of Mandate Palestine. On such a portion of land Israel could accept a Palestinian “state” as long as it can ensure it remains an Israeli protectorate (e.g. demilitarized, with Israeli full control over airspace, strategic control of borders, control of natural resources - water - and restriction with respect to signing international treaties ..). This is conditional on finding a Palestinian leadership that acknowledges Israel as a Jewish state (what president Bush was persuaded to mention in his Aqaba statement), thus relinquishing the right of return for Palestinian refugees, and endangering the status and rights of more than one million Palestinians inside Israel. The accelerated process of Judaization of East Jerusalem and of Hebron and the continued expansion of colonies in WBG are clear indications that Sharon's government has no intention to dismantle any sizeable settlement beyond few caravan outposts.

The dilemma facing the Palestinian leadership is that it is required to dis-empower itself and all Palestinian political groups, and to act as policeman for Israel as pre-conditions to having a vague semblance of statehood (that would be viable and sovereign in name only). The declaration of Sharon saying that it is not in the interest of Israel to rule over 3.5 million Palestinians means that the envisaged Palestinian state will not be more than an Israeli protectorate (and a source of cheap labour, and a captive market). But even a Palestinian state which is an Israeli protectorate can become available, according to Israeli-American agenda, only after Palestinians give up their internationally acknowledged collective rights. The infrastructure for such a protectorate has already been laid down by the separation wall, the security fences around settlements, security roads and bypass roads that continue to cut off the Palestinian villages from each other and the villages from their land, and the continued expansion of settlements that were already vastly expanded during the Oslo era (settlements, and roads that constitute about half the total area of the West Bank).

The facts on the ground show that the Palestinian "state" Sharon is envisaging will be a collection of five enclaves cut off from one another (Jerusalem, with another three enclaves in the WB, and an enclave in Gaza Strip). As such there has been no commitment, on the Israeli part, that settlements inside each enclave will be dismantled. The "separation wall" which is being built is not meant to be 'temporary' considering its massive fortifications and the Palestinian land it is eating up. Some of the land the 'wall' is destroying and annexing is considered to be the most productive and fertile of the Palestinian farmland. An Israeli journalist, Amira Hass, in a recent article in the Israeli daily Ha'aretz, describes the situation as follows: “the massive construction in Jerusalem and its environs, from Bethlehem to Ramallah, and the Dead Sea to Modi'in, has already ruled out any Palestinian urban, industrial or cultural development worthy of the name in the area of East Jerusalem. The southern enclave of the West Bank, from Hebron to Bethlehem, will be cut off from the central enclave of the Ramallah area by an ocean of manicured Israeli settlements, tunnel roads and highways. The northern enclave, from Jenin to Nablus, will be cut off from the center by the massive settlement bloc of Ariel-Eli-Shiloh….”. And she adds that between the Jordan Valley “and the divided Palestinian "state" there will be settlements with tiny populations and enormous land reserves, like Itamar, Nokdim and Tekoah, as well as huge settlements like Ma'aleh Adumim".
However, I found it difficult to agree with her conclusion that the highly unequal struggle of Palestinians with Israel could persuade the Palestinians to decide to accept a 'Bantustan state that is expected to absorb hundreds of thousands of refugees'. The Palestinians - regardless of what some of their leaders decide - given the long memory of national struggle and dispossession, will not accept such a settlement, nor would Palestinian refugees accept to give their right of return for the chance to live in a Bantustan state. Already the demography of Mandate Palestine (equal number of Jews and Arabs) makes it possible for the struggle to develop into a struggle for the creation of a bi-national democratic state on the whole of historic Palestine; a vision that is more dreaded by the Israeli Zionist establishment that a two-states solution.

The roadmap is built on phases, but it is not the Quartet which decides whether the stipulated steps in each phase have been implemented by the two parties, before the next phase begins. The USA has imposed a monopoly over the monitoring process of the roadmap (indeed none of the other members of the Quartet was present at Sharm al-Sheikh or Aqaba summits). The control of the monitoring process by the United States gives it a veto over the process (when and if it starts), which, in effect, enables Israel to have the initiative and to proceed as it sees fit.

A long history of delays and procrastinations has bedevilled implementations of international resolutions and accords between Israelis and Palestinians. The roadmap does not have the needed features to be different from the previous accords. With the coming, in next year, of the presidential election in the United States, Bush’s eyes will focus, even more than before, on winning Jewish votes and donations. This means putting more pressure on the Palestinian leadership to adopt measures that are unacceptable to Palestinians, particularly their giving up the right to resist the Israeli military-settler occupation before any agreement to end this occupation is arrived at.

We need to remember too that President Bush's direct involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict comes soon after the USA-British occupation of Iraq. That is at a moment when the United States feels that the Middle East is more strongly under its domination, and the Arab States more inclined to comply with its demands, hence it is likely to use more pressure on the Arab states in its efforts to restructure the Middle East to serve its global strategy. With hostility against the USA at its highest among the Arab and Moslem peoples for its unconditional support to Israel and its aggressive imperialist policies, we can expect much turmoil ahead, following the collapse of the roadmap.

* Jamil Hilal is a Palestinian sociologist living in Ramallah, he has several publications on Palestinian society and politics.