PALESTINIAN ELITE
Jamil Hilal  

Elite is identified by positions its members hold in the major fields of society. They are more clearly identified in the political field than in the other field, owing to the leading (and visible) positions they hold in public institutions in which they reside, and through which they exercise influence and control. Since numerous political institutions can exit in the political system (depending on its type), a multiplicity of elites can exit in the political field, as well in civil society and the private economic sphere. Where no rules for elite recruitment are established or agreed upon, then contest between competing elites is resolved by crude force or through negotiations between major contenders. A multiplicity of elites (in terms of bases of power, modes of organization, and ideologies) within a national political field (or a territorial state political domain), and the operation or non operation of “rules of the game” that regulate how they relate to each other, is one of the major determinants of the character of the political system (e.g., the presence of liberal democracy and the acknowledgement or rejection of the legitimacy of the existence of autonomous centers of power in the society).

This article limits itself to a very sketch of Palestinian political elites and no or little reference will be made to other elites (residing in top economic, social, cultural, mass media and intellectual institutions). Political elites occupy the top positions of political institutions, including political parties and mass social movements.

Statelessness, as represented by the Palestinian case, does not mean the absence of a “national” political elites. For elites emerge with the rise of a national liberation movement, which takes upon itself the construction of a national political field, which is articulated institutionally (through the building or operation of national institutions), procedurally formation (through the laying down of rules of the political game) and culturally (the construction of “identity” narratives).

Palestinian elites before the Nakba (1948)
Palestinian political elites, before 1948, reflected the internal balance of force in Palestinian society with a structure of a colonial state (Britain) and a colonizing movement (Zionism). Hence political elites were recruited and represented notable families (large landlords and traders), particularly from Jerusalem. Contestation between these families for political dominance was one of the main mechanisms of elite formation at the time. Contestation reflected the struggle to maintain inherited privileges and to refashion them within the context of the struggle for the establishment of statehood.

All the major notable families, established their own political parties (e.g., the Nashashibi family established the National Defense Party in 1934, and the Husainis established the Arab Palestinian Party in 1935, the Nablus families established in 1935 the National Block Party, while a number of other notable families from different areas established in the same year the Reform Party,…..). These parties attempted to widen the power base of the main notable families to encompass the totally of the imagined national community, and to modernize the basis of organization to resemble modern political party, without necessarily destroying that of family networks. There were in addition political formation, which were not led by these notable families, such as the communist party, and al-Qassam movement, which relied on organizing and arming the poor peasants, and the Istiqal party that was inspired by a vision of a modernizing state. However these remained mostly on the margin or could not survive the various pressures they encountered.

The top elite combined, in their contestation for leadership, multiple “assets”. These assets included religious status (acquired through Ottoman or British appointments like the position of Mufti), family influence, administrative position and wealth. The rivalry between the notable families (particularly between the Husainies and the Neshashibies) tended to ignore changes that were taking place in Palestine and transforming the relations between towns and villages and between towns themselves, particularly between the fast growing coastal and cosmopolitan cities such as Jaffa and the traditional hilly towns (such as Nablus and Hebron) that remained dominated by traditional families and occupations. This is one main reason, why the Palestinian national project was defeated. There was in addition the huge gap in the balance of forces that existed at the time between the British Empire and a colonial settler movement on the one hand and an underdeveloped nationalist movement on the other.

However two features that were possessed by the top elite (represented the politburos of political parties, Higher National Committee, leaders of mass organizations, Moslem-Christian committees), were reproduced later with the establishment of the PLO in the late sixties. These were; firstly a spontaneous secular vision of politics, partly to counteract the Zionist project which made religion a determinate definition of nationality, and partly to reflect a long-established composition of Palestinian society. Secondly, a majority of the political elite possessed a university education. Palestinian Christians were highly represented in all political and national formation, in ratios (often the double or more) that exceeded their percent in the population (stood at 11% at the time). The specializations of elite education were varied, they included: law, Sharia (Muslim jurisprudence) religion, medicine, social sciences engineering, literature and history.

Disappearance of National Elites (1948-1969)
With the destruction of the Palestinian national movement, and the dispersal of Palestinian society when Israel was created in 1948, it becomes difficult to identify a national elite. There no longer existed a clearly demarked Palestinian national political field represented by a territorial state or by national institutions. Local elites were formed of the main Palestinian communities as were allowed by the territorial states where Palestinian communities existed (e.g. Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt). For example, in the WBG, Jordan and Egypt played a determining role in the recruitment Palestinian local elites through appointments as municipal heads (e.g Shawa figures in Gaza, Ga’bari and Fraig and Masri in the West Bank) and member of national assemblies (in the case of Jordan). At this period the local elites in the WBG relied on their positions in government organs and on playing the role of the intermediary between the Palestinian community and a non-Palestinian central government. However, the dependence of local elites on territorial states, which were not sympathetic to Palestinian national aspirations, weakened these elites, including the Jerusalemite families. The integration of the Jerusalemite religious establishment in the Jordanian regimes institutions after 1948 undermined the Jerusalem families that dominated the political elites before the Nakba. The annexation of the City of Jerusalem, by Israel following the 1967 war narrowed farther the status of Jerusalemite families despite the survived of the Supreme Muslim Council, which enjoyed tangible influence. The 1976 municipal elections in the West Bank (apart from East Jerusalem) further diminished the influence of “notable” families as success went, in most municipalities, to personalities supporting PLO towards which the majority of notable families showed clear ambivalence.

The PLO fashions a national elite
Since the resistance factions captured and remolded it, in 1969, and until the advent of the PNA, in 1994, the PLO was the sole generator of national political elites. It was also instrumental in the formation of local elites. The top political leadership of the PLO consisted of those who founded the main organizations that were represented, by a system of quota, in the leading bodies of the PLO (e.g, Fateh, PFLP, DFLP). During this period hardly any change occurred in the composition of political elites. The top political leadership (members of the Central Committee of Fateh and members of the politburos of the other major political factions) remained as it is with little change as it was a historic leadership of the contemporary Palestinian national movement. As a leadership it was formed and operated political and other institutions outside Palestine, a situation that created conflict (often armed conflict as in Jordan in 1970-71 and in Lebanon in the early seventies, and Syria in the eighties) not only with Israel, but also with the Arab situation where the leader happen to situate itself. However, once the center of Palestinian political arena moved from outside to the occupied territories (i.e, the WBG) - gradually during the 1980s and the outbreak of the first Intifada at the end of 1987, and decisively after the Oslo Accord and the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) - the composition of the political elites began to reflect this change and to co-opt political elite from these territories.

In short the political elite (as well as the leadership of mass and professional organizations and in the military and intellectual fields) carried the mark of a national liberation movement that had to operate from moving headquarters outside Palestine and adopted various strategies and organizational forms as it sought statehood on its territory. But the vision of the future Palestine state remained a secular vision (as the Declaration of Independence of 1998 testifies), and Palestinian Christians (composing less than they did before 1948) remained an integral part of Palestinian politics (the leaders two of the main PLO factions were Christians up to the year 2000 when one resigned). This situation changed noticeably once the PLO was able to operate on its territory and to establish quasi-state structures in the form of the PNA following the Oslo accords in 1993.

Elite formation under the PNA
The leadership of the PLO and its factions were qualitatively different from the notable families of the pre-1948 era. The new elite was mostly middle and lower middle class. Moreover it was no longer confined to the cities and town as it embraced individuals from refugee camps, and rural areas, both of which benefited from the democratization of education during the fifties and sixties and seventies. The PLO and its factions relied heavily in its mobilization and paramilitary organization on refugee camps outside Palestine, and its mass organizations (women, workers, youth) reached villages, camps and poor areas in the towns in the WBG. It was this empowerment of the sectors of the Palestinian society that were marginal by the pre-1948 notable family leadership that distinguished the style of the PLO elite. Not only it separated itself from the old class leadership, but also gave minimal role to Palestinian bourgeoisie inside and outside Palestine.

The PNA as a quasi- state was formed and led by the main faction in the PLO, i.e., Fateh, which became the ruling party and most of the PLO factions as well as the Islamic movement become the opposition. As a ruling party it had to rely on the new quasi- state structures it created (particularly the police and security agencies as well as the m various ministries and public institutions). These were manned and headed mostly by Fateh leaders and cadres, both from the inside and returnees. This led to a genuine change in the composition of the elite, without diminishing the powers of Arafat who remained at the apex of the political pyramid.

The PNA, saw itself and was seen by many Palestinians and others, as a state-in-the-making. As such it furnished itself with the symbols and paraphernalia of statehood before questions of borders, Israeli colonial settlements, water rights, East Jerusalem and the issue of sovereignty were addressed. Thus ministries and authorities of different functions were set up, elections were held in 1996 and a legislative council (parliament) was elected. The political system was proceeding to be organized on the basis of a government and an opposition. Fateh, which dominated the PLO became, following the general elections of 1996, to dominate, by democratic procedures, the executive and legislative branches of power. The Oslo accords entailed that negotiations would determine the outcome of the final settlement and this entailed sidestepping the institutions of the PLO as the PNA acquired quasi-state power. However it soon transpired that the colonial power conception of a settlement does not go beyond a client state on parts of the WGS with no prospects of viability and the accepted limits of sovereignty, not to mention a refusal to acknowledge responsibly for the problem of the Palestinian refugees. The general election of 1996 did produce an elected leadership that redressed the balance in favour of the WBG without dislodging the older “outside” PLO leadership, which remained powerful within the system of rule. The Islamic movement became the major political opposition. The secular Left lost much of its constituency and could not address its entrenched fragmentation.

The second intifada – erupted in late September 2000 - represented a declaration that the national project of a viable statehood is in danger of liquidation by Israel. It gradually began to shift the balance of forces back towards the function of a national liberation movement, which previously was represented by the PLO. The PNA structures and Fateh began to be centers of resistance with the Islamic movement following suit, although with different conceptions of resistance. The fragmentation of the occupied territories, through military roadblocks and sieges, into many tens of confined areas, shifted the balance of action towards regional leadership (e.g, Marwan Bargouthi among others), and the resistance revived regular joint meetings of “national and Islamic forces” which issued statements on the situation and outlined some tasks related mostly to demonstrations, processions and martyr funerals.

Although Fateh played a prominent role in the second Intifada, it lost support, unlike Hamas. This could be a result of the diminished role of the PNA as a result of Israeli policies which included the fragmentation, re-occupation and siege of areas under PNA control, closure, the systematic destruction of Palestinian territory physical infrastructure and symbols of its sought sovereignty (airport, port, broadcasting station), and inflecting maximum damage to the Palestinian economy. It is generally acknowledged that while the financial resources of the PNA diminished greatly, and its ability to address peoples’ needs was significantly undermined, Hamas has expanded its relief programs in a situation characterized by a high rate of unemployment, sharp rise in of poverty rates, with civilian causalities and damage to property. In fact a year in the Inifada public opinion polls showed Hamas wielding a similar rate of support to Fateh (about 25% each). The outcome of the present Israeli-Palestinian confrontation will leave its mark on the political system as well as the composition of the political elite.

An embryonic economic elite
The establishment of the PNA has promoted some of the conditions necessary for the local businessmen to become alert to newly available opportunities and of the need to create organizational frameworks that monitor such opportunities. The most obvious indicator of this awareness is the rise, first in the West Bank of sectoral representative bodies such as: the Food Industries Union and the Textile Industries Union, in addition to businessmen associations. A strong orientation to expand the scope of these sectoral representative bodies to include Gaza Strip, was also developing fast. An organization like Paltradeii has on its agenda the generation of organizational frameworks for merging together the private sectors in the WBG. The last two years before the second Intifada saw systematic attempts by local businessmen to influence economic legislations, and the year 2000 saw the establishment of a coordination council for the private sector’s organizations together with the federation of the chambers of commerce, Paltrade, the federation of industries and businessmen associations.

But a gap still separates local and expatriate capital (Palestinian big businessmen residing abroad who started investment in the Palestinian territories after the advent of a national authority). The local capitalist elite feel that expatriate Palestinian capital investing in the Palestinian territories has imposed its hegemony over large companies and has established a direct link with the top leadership of the PNA giving the latter a partnership in return for being granted monopolistic or semi- monopolistic privileges. It accuses the major part of the expatriate big Palestinian of indifference to democratic values. Conversely expatriate capital perceives local capital as unqualified to play a leading role in the Palestinian economy owing to its small size and mediocre knowledge of the world economy. This, of course, does not mean that expatriate Palestinian capital is ready to invest heavily in Palestinian economy. For despite the incentives offered to it (such as that offered by the Investment Law and the participation of the PNA in joint ventures), expatriate capital is held back by high political insecurity surrounding the future of the Palestinian areas. There is also the very small size of its markets and absence of actual integration between them resulting from Israeli imposed closures.

It remains to point out that economic policies are taken at the top of the political pyramid (by the president and his economic advisers). The second level includes ministries and agencies directly concerned with economic affairs (including the group that steers the public sector and public investments), and conducts official economic relations and signs agreements. There is a third level represented by the executives and technical organs that formulate and put forward policy suggestions, which are usually subjected to discussion and debate before they are submitted as recommendations to the top political leadership. There have been indications of the increase in the weight of technocrats in the formulation process of project and proposals in both public and private sectors before the eruption of the second intifada.


General Remarks
Palestinian national political elites have been formed within the context of the Palestinian national movement since its emergence the second decade of the twentieth century, its re-structuring in the 1960s, and its reorganization in 1994 following the establishment of the PNA. All attempts to create national elites outside the Palestinian national movement have failed, with one exception, i.e., the Islamic movement, but only when it took up arms against the Israeli occupation. Qualitative change affected the formation of Palestinian political elites after the Nakba of 1948, and particularly after the rise of the Palestinian resistance and the PLO. Important transformations of elite formation are evident after the establishment of the PNA. Most important has been the emerging relationship between the top political elite and the emerging economic elite in the private sector as well as between the political power and the notable families, which have transformed themselves from landowning-trading class into a class engaged in modern business. The prospects of these transformations depend very much on the outcome the second intifada. Should Israel succeed in demolishing the PNA, the most likely outcome will be the emergence of a new political elite dominated probably by the local Islamic movement. Furthermore the new economic elite that emerged with PNA and was promoted by it will disappear.