SIX MONTHS AFTER THE EVENTS OF 11 Sept. 2002
Joseph A. Buttigieg  

We have come together to mark a terrible day, to reaffirm a just cause, and to thank the many nations that shared our resolve and will share our common victory.” This was the opening lime of the speech that George W. Bush delivered on the White House grounds on March 11th at a ceremony commemorating the events that six months earlier had shaken the US and the rest of the world. It was a ceremony choreographed with meticulous care to convey an image of the US as a leading member of a community of nations working harmoniously together to defend nothing less than civilization itself against the evil forces of terrorism. The dignitaries present included 100 foreign ambassadors and 170 national flags were prominently displayed. The symbolism and the rhetoric of the occasion were clearly meant to stress the international dimension of the “war on terror.” The speech was designed to focus on the unity of nations confronting a common enemy rather than on the wounds inflicted on the US and its thirst for vengeance.
Expressions of grief for those who lost their lives on September 11th and sympathy for the bereaved families were limited to a few sentences. Six months after the US was jolted by a frontal attack that wrecked its secure sense of invulnerability, George Bush’s words were carefully crafted to exude confidence and let the world know that the great superpower had lost none of its self-assurance. Rather than reflect back on the national trauma, Bush chose to provide a rosy assessment of the current situation and to point to a future of victorious struggles. Far from weakening Bush, the events of September 11th enabled him to grow immeasurably in stature. The nation stands solidly behind him—the latest polls register an 80% approval rating; and few of his political adversaries dare criticize him openly for fear of political backlash. Bush has no reason to look back now that he has acquired the boldness of a leader who in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of US citizens can do no wrong, especially on the international front. The rest of the world views him differently, of course; which is why his speech of March 11th was aimed at, among other things, ameliorating his image abroad. Adopting the posture of a grand statesman, he spoke as if his policies and actions transcended immediate political and national considerations and were motivated primarily by a concern for the security and well-being of the whole world
Repeatedly, in the first part of his speech, the US president attempted to depict the “war on terror” as a global venture undertaken by a large number of nations working together as “partners” with a single purpose. “A mighty coalition of civilized nations is now defending our common security,” Bush stated, before drawing attention explicitly to the presence of the foreign dignitaries. “With us today are representatives from many of our partners in this great work, and we’re proud to display their flags at the White House this morning.” He then went on to stress the role being played by different nations. “More than half of the forces now assisting the heroic Afghan fighters, or providing security in Kabul, are from countries other than the United States. [ . . .] In total, 17 nations have forces deployed in the region.” He mentioned several countries by name: Germany, Denmark, Australia, Uzbekistan and, of course, Great Britain and Pakistan, among others.
With these rhetorical gestures Bush clearly wanted to appear magnanimous and grateful. His real intent, however, was quite different. The true purpose of the speech was twofold: a) to repair or cover over the fissures between the US and its putative allies caused by the unilateralism of the world’s only superpower; and b) to attempt to place the same “allies” in a position that would make it difficult for them to overtly oppose, resist, or in any way hamper the efforts of the US to further extend its “war on terror” and to bring down Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq.
It is most unlikely that any of the seasoned diplomats who attended George Bush’s speech on 11 March rushed back to their embassies to send messages to their respective governments reassuring them that, notwithstanding all evidence to the contrary, the US really wants to work in tandem with other nations, not as a domineering superpower but as a sort of primus inter pares. “Our good ally France has deployed nearly one-fourth of its navy to support Operation Enduring Freedom,” said Bush. But this open acknowledgement of France’s contribution to the Afghan campaign can hardly be expected to induce France to attenuate its open criticism of the way in which the US conducts its foreign policy. Likewise, Bush’s expression of appreciation of the German army’s sacrifices (including the loss of life) in Kabul will not remove that country’s profound discomfort with US unilateralism. The same is true of other countries with the possible exception of Britain—or at least of Tony Blair. The German foreign minister Joshua Fischer’s view that the unilateralist policy of the US effectively reduces its allies to the role of “satellite” states is not only widely shared but is also one of the main reasons behind the rising tide of anti-Americanism worldwide.
Such phrases as “a mighty coalition of civilized nations,” “common security,” “our partners,” “the world’s concerted response,” “the many nations that share our resolve and will share our common victory” reside at the very heart of Bush’s rhetorical construct—an imaginary world in which the “good” are acting in unison against the “evil”. It is a fiction which bears no relation whatsoever to the actual situation. The very fact that Bush constructed this self-serving fiction while totally ignoring the profound misgivings of the US’s closest allies and the apprehensions (to say nothing of the resentment) of the rest of the world cannot but reinforce the view that the US refuses to listen to anyone whose views, interests, and needs differ from its own. Only the most gullible of observers could fail to detect the brazen cynicism that belied Bush’s rhetorical exaltation of the comity of nations.
Since assuming office Bush has shown nothing but disinterest in—and, at times, even undisguised disdain for—international cooperation. Impervious to all criticism, the US has repeatedly signalled its willingness to “go it alone.” Before September 11th, the US declared its repudiation of the Kyoto accords; announced its decision to proceed with the construction of the “missile shield” even if it meant unilaterally abrogating the SALT treaty; resisted the establishment of an international court of justice; and reversed the process of rapprochement towards North Korea that had been initiated by Bill Clinton and was being assiduously cultivated by South Korea. Since September 11th, the US has pursued a course of action that effectively sidelined the United Nations, NATO, and the European Community; it has haughtily ignored the plight of the Palestinians, dismissed the appeals of the “civilized” nations to restrain Israel’s deadly use of military force against civilian targets, and gave Ariel Sharon a carte blanche; it has brushed aside calls to respect the Geneva conventions in its treatment of the prisoners transported to its military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and, most recently, it has violated its own free market principles in order to protect the domestic steel industry from foreign competition. This record of isolationism and unilateralism makes it virtually impossible for anyone to believe that on the morning of 11 March 2002 George W. Bush underwent a sudden conversion. Many of the alliances and “partnerships” that the Bush administration has forged during the past six months are circumstantial and opportunistic; in some cases they have been achieved through subtle coercion and/or promises of irresistibly large amounts of financial “assistance.”
The second part of Bush’s March 11th speech makes it unmistakably clear that the US is now demanding support (or at the very least acquiescence) for what he called “the second stage of the war on terror.” This so-called “second stage” does not really represent a new development in US strategy. In fact, the basic elements of this strategy were already adumbrated in numerous speeches made by Bush and leading members of his administration in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September attacks. Six months ago, the US administration repeatedly declared it s intention to launch an offensive against all terrorists everywhere and against any nation that harbored them. And it was no secret that already, at that time, influential members of the administration were strongly urging Bush to seize the occasion to launch an all-out attack on Iraq. Hence, when Bush affirmed on 11 March that “I have set a clear policy in the second stage of the war on terror,” he was in fact referring to a policy that had been formulated as far back as late September and early October of last year. Indeed, even before 11 March, the US had already sent “special forces” and “advisors” to the Philippines, Yemen, and Georgia to “assist” in the hunting down and the elimination of terrorist groups.
The “second stage of the war of terror” announced by Bush is, in reality, the second stage of a diplomatic offensive aimed at obtaining international support—or, at a minimum, tacit assent—for a decisive war on Iraq. The most significant and disturbing segment of Bush’s speech of 11 March is its conclusion. For that is where Bush put forward the argument that the “war on terror” necessitates an attack on Iraq (which is never explicitly named). How does one justify demanding of the nations currently supporting the struggle against Bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban that they also lend their support to a war on Iraq? Bush’s rhetorical ploy was to assert that the two operations were just inseparable parts of one and the same shared objective. This is how Bush put it: [ . . .] every nation in our coalition must take seriously the growing threat of terror on a catastrophic scale—terror armed with biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons. America is now consulting with friends and allies about this greatest of dangers, and we’re determined to confront it.
Here is what we already know: some states that sponsor terror are seeking or already possess weapons of mass destruction; terrorist groups are hungry for these weapons and would use them without a hint of conscience.
One need only put these declarations in the context of the earlier speech on the “axis of evil” and of the subsequent shift of the US position vis-à-vis Israel to dispel any doubt that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein has become an idée fixe within the Bush administration. In just a matter of days, Bush went from blaming Arafat for the spiral of violence in the Middle East to reprimanding Israel for its military invasion of Palestinian towns and refugee camps. The US even participated in a formulating a resolution at the UN recognizing the Palestinian right to statehood. At the same time, it dispatched its special envoy, General Zinni, to Israel, and sent the hitherto reclusive vice-president Cheney on a tour of various Arab capitals. Meanwhile, Israel has been instructed to refrain from expressions of dissent. Never before has the pro-Israeli lobby in the US failed to react vociferously to slightest sign of softness in the American support for the Jewish state. On the other hand, though, one must bear in mind that nothing would please Israel more than the elimination of Saddam Hussein. Nor is it a coincidence that precisely at this juncture the Bush administration permitted the leaking of a document—the “Nuclear Posture Review”—that contemplates the use of “new” tactical nuclear weapons in pre-emptive strikes against adversaries that it deems especially dangerous even if they lack nuclear capability. This leak was clearly intended to send a strong signal to Iraq. In short, the US seems prepared to go to any lengths to depose Saddam Hussein.
Why this obsession with Iraq? At the end of the Gulf War there was widespread displeasure in US political and military circles: the crushing of Iraq on the battlefield, many believed, was squandered when Saddam Hussein was allowed to retain power. When the heavy trade sanctions and the strict military interdictions that were supposed to debilitate the regime in Baghdad failed to have the desired effect, displeasure turned to anger. The expulsion of the United Nations weapons inspectors further exacerbated the odium towards Iraq. And, to make matters even worse, Iraq obtained the support of major countries, such as France and Russia, in its diplomatic campaign to soften the sanctions that had been imposed upon it. All of this suggests that a strong-willed leader can successfully defy the US and raise doubts about the effectiveness and reach of its power. Saddam Hussein, much like Bin Laden has become a hero of the anti-American masses in the Arab world and beyond. The US finds it impossible to tolerate the existence of a leader who appears capable of defying it with impunity.
Saddam Hussein no longer poses a credible threat to US access to Middle East oil, on which it heavily depends; he does, however, seriously undermine the ability of the US to impose its will on the world. On the eve of the Persian Gulf War, George H. Bush, the father of the current president, claimed that Iraq constituted a threat to the “new world order.” The US now regards itself not only as the ultimate guardian of the “new world order” but also as the nation that is best qualified to define the shape of the “new world order.” In short, Iraq represents a threat to the US monopoly of global power. That is why the US may go as far as to strain its relations with its best allies and to risk serious rifts with many other countries in order to rid itself of this great thorn in its side.
During the past few weeks, one member of the Bush administration after another has seized every available opportunity to echo the president’s March 11th speech by repeatedly linking Iraq with “weapons of mass destruction.” It may very well be the case that Iraq is indeed developing (and may have already developed) such weapons. But there are two basic questions that the Bush administration does not seem willing to address: What proof is there that Iraq has the capability to deliver these weapons successfully beyond its borders? Is military action the best or only way to deprive Iraq of such capability? After September 11th the US experienced a great scare when anthrax sent through the postal system caused a number of deaths and seriously disrupted government operations. The failure to prevent the anthrax attacks and the subsequent inability of the authorities to identify the perpetrator cannot be attributed to a lack of military preparedness. The anthrax terrorist, like the al-Qaeda operatives who commandeered four airplanes on September 11th, took advantage of flaws in the security apparatus. (In the case of the hijackers, the security system they breached was “privatized.”) These are not problems that can be solved by boosting the Pentagon’s budget or by dropping bombs on hostile forces. It is, of course, no accident that neither Bush nor any member of his administration ever mentioned the “weapon of mass destruction” called anthrax in the countless speeches and interviews they gave in recent weeks.
George Bush and his envoys repeatedly assert that they are holding discussions with US political leaders and allies about the Iraqi problem. One of the most hawkish members of the Bush administration, the Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz (who has been calling for an attack on Iraq since last October), said in an interview on CNN on March 16th that “we’ve got to work with the American people, we’ve got to consult with our allies”—which is no different from what Bush stated in his March 11th speech. Such statements, however, lack credibility, coming as they do from an administration that has used every imaginable ploy to avoid discussing its actions and plans with anyone. The White House has been invoking “executive privilege” every time the US Congress attempts to call it to explain its actions. (“Executive privilege” has also been invoked to protect vice-president Dick Cheney from an embarrassing inquiry related to the Enron scandal.) The Bush administration is making a mockery of democracy on multiple fronts. The press has been given very limited access to and highly selective information about the military operations in Afghanistan. The Attorney General, John Ashcroft has tried to silence and discredit critics of the Patriot Act (which severely curtails individual civil liberties and gives the security services, such as the FBI, enormous powers to investigate and arrest citizens) by accusing them of favoring terrorists. Elected officials are kept in the dark about security measures and military strategy. The Bush administration, it turns out, is as unilateralist in its relations with the US Congress as it is vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
Some lawmakers are starting to voice their frustration with the administration’s secrecy annd aloofness. On March 12th the New York Times published an article by the most senior Democratic member of the US Senate, Robert C. Byrd of West Virginiia ( a State that voted for Bush in the presidential election). His harsh observations are particularly noteworthy, especially because Senator Byrd commands great respect when he speaks on constitutional issues. H e wrote:
Congress has a constitutional responsibility to weigh in on war-related policy decisions. Yet in this war on terrorism, Congress, by and large, has been left to learn about major war-related decisions through newspaper articles. [. . . ]
Is it any wonder that members of Congress are beginning to question whether the administration is deliberately leaving Congress in the dark—or whether the administration is making major policy decisions on the fly, without taking time for due consideration or consultation? Neither scenario is comforting.
The Bush administration has, thus far, shown no inclination to permit an open public debate on the way the “war on terror” is being conducted and the way it should proceed. Instead, the US president is exploiting to the maximum the sweeping authority seemingly granted to him by a resolution—called “Authorization for the Use of Military Force”—that Congress hastily approved (with only one dissenting vote) on 14 September 2001. The following is the pertinent part of the resolution: [. . .] the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations and persons.
It remains to be seen whether the same Congress that passed this resolution is now capable of restraining the President’s bellicose impulse. In order to do so, he members of Congress need to muster the courage to go against the sentiments of the vast majority of their constituents—and this being an election year, doing so might even cost them their seats. From the point of view of the average US citizen—whose knowledge of and interest in the rest of the world is minimal at best—Bush’s policies seem to be working rather well. The economy is already recovering after a brief recession, the stock market has recouped the losses it suffered in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks, the military campaign in Afghanistan is deemed successful and has cost very few US lives (and there’s not much concern about the massive civilian death toll in Afghanistan), and life has returned more or less to normal (the only minor irritant are the long lines at airport security checkpoints).
For the rest of the world, of course, the situation remains extremely precarious. Though George Bush and his emissaries continue to employ the rhetoric of cooperation, consultation, and international unity, few are inclined to believe them. In any case, foreign pressure is not likely to have much of an impact on the decision making processes of the White House and the Pentagon. Unless the US Congress lives up to its responsibilities, Bush’s already dangerous policies may become reckless, and inflict upon the world horrors not witnessed since the incineration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The New York Times editorial of March 12th, was titled “America As Nuclear Rogue” —it succinctly articulated the nightmarish implications of the Bush administrations militaristic tendencies:
If another country were planning o develop a new nuclear weapon and contemplating pre-emptive strikes against a list of non-nuclear powers, Washington would rightly label that nation a dangerous rogue state. Yet such is the course recommended to President Bush by a new Pentagon planning paper [i.e., the Nuclear Posture Review].
[. . . ]
Since the dawn of the nuclear age, American military planners have had to factor these enormously destructive weapons into their calculations. Their behavior has been tempered by the belief, shared by most thoughtful Americans, that the weapons should be used only when the nation’s most basic interest or national survival is at risk, and that the unrestrained use of nuclear weapons could end life on earth as we know it. Nuclear weapons are not just another part of the military arsenal. They are different, and lowering the threshold for their use is reckless folly.
The US bestrides the world like a colossus, more powerful than any imperial power in the annals of history. No longer content with being hegemonic, the US now feels compelled to dominate—by force if necessary. The urgent task of the “civilized world” now is to figure out a way to persuade the Bush administration that the exercise of force is conducive to barbarism. As a first step, “the mighty coalition of civilized nations” should ask George W. Bush to stop speaking on its behalf—for, notwithstanding his lofty rhetoric, Bush’s single-minded pursuit of US interests is posing the most serious threat to the stability and well-being of the rest of world.